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ABSTRACT 
 
Among the people in Greater China (People’s Republic of China [PRC], Taiwan 
and Hong Kong), needless to say, economic incentive, political relations and 
business relations all conjure up an ethos of relations, if not close bonds, 
among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC. The rise of China matters to everyone 
who lives in Greater China. Hong Kong is already part of China. Taiwan, 
according to the PRC, cannot be independent without running the risk of a war. 
Yet, my question is that are those Chinese the same in Greater China? Do they 
have different identities? If living with China is inevitable, do they need to search 
for a new identity to face the challenges?1
 
Keywords: Chineseness, Greater China, identity, national boundaries, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This paper is prepared for the inaugural workshop of the research network: ‘China in the World, 
the World in China (ChinaWorld)’ held by the Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business 
School on 10-11 March 2006. Works in progress. Please do not cite. 
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 Introduction 
 
Among the people in Greater China (People’s Republic of China [PRC], 
Taiwan and Hong Kong), needless to say, economic incentive, political relations 
and business relations all conjure up an ethos of relations, if not close bonds, 
among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC. The rise of China matters to everyone 
who lives in Greater China. Hong Kong is already part of China. Taiwan, 
according to the PRC, cannot be independent without running the risk of a war. 
Yet, my question is that are those Chinese the same in Greater China? Do they 
have different identities? If living with China is inevitable, do they need to search 
for a new identity to face the challenges?   
   
To define identity, one usually will come across national identity and social 
identity. For national identity, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim argued that “… a 
nation’s identity is normally circumscribed by its boundaries, whose dimensions 
tend to coincide with such objective criteria as common language, ethnic or 
racial origin, and political culture…” 1  Henri Tajfel, however, defined social 
identity as “… part [italic in original] of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significant attached to that membership.”2 More 
recently, Callahan defined the notion of the identity of Greater China as 
“contingent” which “allows us to trace out the discursive economies of self/Other 
relations in Chinese”3
 
The first one emphases the boundary which particularly refers to the 
political boundaries between nation states. The second definition refers more 
toward the self-concept of one’s membership in a group. The third definition 
takes us back to the ascribed status that enjoyed by the Chinese in Greater 
China to use culture and civilization as their collective denominator of their 
Chineseness. These definitions serve some important roles to conceptualize 
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 our understanding of Greater China’s identity. Yet, they are not entirely 
satisfactory to capture the construction process of the identity of Greater China. 
For one thing, the political boundary between the PRC and Hong Kong had 
been redefined after the changeover in 1997 when Hong Kong became part of 
China. Yet, the political boundary between the PRC and Taiwan is not yet 
defined by any formal agreement. Taiwan’s only constraint is not to go for 
independence according the PRC; otherwise reunification can be resorted 
through the use of force. Besides, the majority of the people in Greater China 
certainly subscribe to the very general concept of being Chinese. However, the 
ethnic and socio-economic or political recognition can be very different. If we 
belief what Benedict Anderson once contended that “Nations, however, have no 
clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never 
natural. Because there is no Originator, the nation’s biography cannot be written 
evangelically, ‘down time,’ through a long procreative chain of begettings,”4 we 
should be willing to accept that many things can therefore be written into the up-
bringing and the nurturing of the context of Greater China.  
 
This paper argues that both Hong Kong and Taiwan are struggling one 
way or another to influence, but more often than not to be influenced by the 
rapprochement of China. It is intriguing to know how and in what ways the 
general public attribute their future economic, social and economic relations 
with China. It seems that the construction of identity within Greater China 
cannot be defined autonomously. It has to mingle with the politics and socio-
economic interaction. The thinning and thickening of the degree of Chineseness 
can be very dynamic. As we have already covered the perspectives of 
integration and interdependence, we want to know more about the socio-
cultural dimensions of the state of affairs of both the Chinese in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. If economic “integrationists” represents one of their choices, I want to 
know if there are any alternative options to re-construct their relations with 
China? This paper will introduce the concept “liminal citizenship” to examine the 
initial process of socio-economic development of Hong Kong’s returning to 
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 China. Secondly, in Taiwan, this paper attempts to look at the identity formation 
through the social construction of the mass media, the so-called “new 
Taiwanese” (referring to Ma Ying-jeou especially), the development of language 
policy in Taiwan and the democratization process to explore the socio-political 
relation within Taiwan.  
 
The central focus of this paper will be on Hong Kong and Taiwan. It does 
not mean that the identity development in China is un-important. In fact, there 
are some interactions between identity development within this Greater China 
region. One of the obvious areas is the idea toward the militarism of the 
Japanese. Nevertheless, I am arguing that there is a kind of central and 
peripheral relation that generates among these areas where China has always 
been considered as the center. 5  Hong Kong has already been integrated. 
Taiwan has not been given any choice of independence; and it has once been 
considered as “renegade province.” It is therefore interesting to understand their 
evolution and development of their own identity along this encapsulation 
process. 
 
Liminal Citizenship: Hong Kong Searching for New Identity 
Political Changes and Socio-economic Adaptability 
 
On the mid-night of June 30, 1997, I was employed by the American 
magazine Newsweek as an interpreter to reach to the border of Hong Kong, 
which was connected with Shenzhen (a neighbouring Chinese city), to interview 
those people who came out to celebrate the changeover and to welcome the 
incoming of the troops from China.6 Jubilation, flag waving and cheerfulness 
culminated with the down-pouring rain to form a unique picture of new political 
development of Hong Kong. In fact, most of the respondents said that they 
welcomed the retuning of Hong Kong to China; and it was very good to be 
governed once again by the Chinese.  
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 However, political change involved many social and cultural factors. After 
jubilation, it followed by a life-long process of re-integration, which involved 
different levels of adjustment and struggle. The changeover of Hong Kong was 
unique in a sense that it was performed in a very peaceful way. Both British 
government and the PRC joined together in a celebration which was regarded 
as a historical moment. Not ver often in the historical de-colonization of the 
former colonies of greater Britain came close to such peaceful transferring of 
political sovereignty. Whilst de-colonization has been uttered, yet, it is not fair to 
equalize the changeover of Hong Kong to those former colonies. First, there 
was no civil war which destroyed millions of lives in those post-colonial 
independent movements. Second, Hong Kong was governed once again by the 
Chinese. It appeared to many people that it did not matter too much to those 
village people whether the troops moving to Hong Kong from China were from 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or from the Kuomintang (KMT) as long as 
they were Chinese at the moment. Third, Hong Kong was very prosperous. It 
was miles away from the economic situations which depicted those former 
colonies in Southeast Asia, South Asia or Africa after WWII.  
 
Nevertheless, the merger between Hong Kong and China does provide 
some soul searching questions to examine the social political development of 
Hong Kong after 1997. On March 10, 2005, Tung Chee Hwa, announced his 
resignation due to the reason of health problem.7 His resignation called an end 
of the first phase (eight years) of the implementation of “one country, two 
systems” after Hong Kong was returned back to China in 1997. In his 2005 
Policy Speech, he finally admitted his weakness of governance. He said, “In 
retrospect, our mindset was inadequately prepared for the dual impacts of 
political change and economic downturn, nor did we have the necessary 
experience to respond appropriately.”8 This timely self criticism correctly pointed 
to the very essence of the challenge and problem of governance of Hong Kong 
under “One country, two systems” principle. However, in the case of Hong Kong, 
after the collapse of the housing market, the rise of unemployment, the 
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 economic downturn, the SARs outbreak, the half million demonstration on the 
street on July 1, 2003 and the inability of electing their own chief executive; 
according to Yeung Au, Hong Kong people began to realise that they should 
rely on their own. More and more people become self-employed as a result.9 It 
is not because they are particularly entrepreneurial. The very basic reason is 
that the established bureaucratic system is changing. Those who are sceptical 
about their employer, who may launch redundant scheme anytime, just escape 
from their original positions. They enjoy this risky but flexible working style, 
especially for those who want to remain their own identity. Yet, this trend is also 
likely to generate a sense of disassociation from the society, resulting in a 
gradual decline of social capital.10
 
As far as I have covered, Hong Kong people try to adapt to the changes. 
Many economic viable ones have already been able to work or even invest in 
the regional coastal cities of China to maintain their economic well being. What 
about the non-viable ones? To mention one example, after the changeover, due 
to the collapse of the housing market, many people suffered from negative 
equity (greatly reducing the values of the housing prices). Some of them also 
suffered from being un-employed because of the down-sizing, etc. Suffering 
from both problems, many people committed suicide. There was also a 
contagious effect of choosing a similar method to end one’s life. They generally 
picked up an outer island called Cheung Chau to rent a resort house. They 
locked themselves up in a sealed room which contained a bucket of burning 
charcoal. After a while, they suffered from the inhalation of too much carbon 
monoxide. Such way of dying was described as very popular at some point. 
 
One may argue that this is only a trivial matter. Let’s turn to look at another 
scene about the competition of taxi industry. Normally when you book a taxi, 
you have to pay extra. Yet, in Hong Kong, when you book an “ultra taxi” you will 
get discount. However, you should prepare to experience a very shocking 
scenario where the driver, whilst driving with one hand on the steering wheel, 
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 actually was flipping the pencil to scribble down the address of next call. They 
are those taxis that in direct competition with those ordinary taxis strolling on the 
street. The only reason is that the drivers want to earn more. What I am 
suggesting is that the original economic establishment has been changed. The 
integration of Hong Kong into China confronts every single individual in Hong 
Kong with the 1.3 billion strong Chinese. When the global economy has been 
complaining the damaging effect of Chinese products to their local economies, 
Hong Kong is just next door to the factory of the world! These are not trivial 
matters. The adaptability of switching to new relations entails the 
successfulness of the changeover.  
 
Liminal Citizenship as Historically and Socially Constructed  
 
It seems that there is a process to go through whilst Hong Kong people 
are in a stage of constructing their “liminal citizenship.”11 The first definition of 
liminal is ‘relating to a transitional or initial stage of process’. The second 
definition of liminal is ‘occupying a position at, or on both sides of, a boundary or 
threshold’.  It was originally from a Latin ‘limen’, ‘limin’-meaning threshold.12 
Citizenship however refers more to the achieved Chinese status governed by 
the geographical boundaries rather than the ascribed cultural status. 
 
By liminal citizenship, I refer to those Hong Kong people who are Chinese 
in nature whilst nurtured in the former British colony, which creates an identity 
anomie in an initial stage of adjusting themselves to their new Chinese 
identity.13 The transition of Hong Kong from British to mainland China in 1997 is 
not only a transition of a political entity from one regime to another but also a 
transition of a set of international elements that have long been engendered 
Hong Kong as an open society, international city with freedom and outward 
looking. Such international elements have nurtured the successfulness of Hong 
Kong from a small fishing village to an international commercial center.  
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 According to the studies by Wong Siu-lun and Zheng Victor W. T. on the 
issue of Hong Kong identity card (ID) and the issue of Huixiangzheng (Identity 
for Mainland Travelling), we can examine the characteristics of Hong Kong 
people’s liminal citizenship. 14  The ID card represented a process of 
indigenization of Hong Kong people. The issue of Huixiangzheng represented a 
process of re-unification with China. In other words, with time, Hong Kong 
people’s identity has been changing in connection with the political development 
of Hong Kong. ID card in Hong Kong was first carried out in 1949. It was mainly 
because of the winning of the Chinese Communist Party. Hong Kong 
government wanted to have more control on the identification of the population. 
More initiatives had been worked out in 1960, 1971 and 1987 to institutionalize 
and implement the ID card. In 2003, the government began the issuing of smart 
ID card, which contained different personal data.15 To combine the ID card with 
the economic development of Hong Kong in the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
identity of Hong Kong people had been economically and socially constructed to 
re-develop their Chineseness and to re-articulate their Hong Kong identity. They 
know they have a new identity, which belongs to Hong Kong people. However, 
they also understand that that identity card is to use for the reducing the time to 
clear the customs between China and Hong Kong, which means the card 
symbolizes a fast-track identity switching token to change one’s identity when 
they cross the border, perhaps not just once a day but twice! Behind the 
construction of the Hong Kong identity, economic progress and economic 
empowerment do constitute their common understanding among themselves. At 
some point, in the 1980s and after 1989, Hong Kong people even tried to 
change their identity by using their economic power to “buy” (naturalization) 
citizenship from Canada, Australia, US, etc.       
 
By the same token, after 1949 and particularly after the Korean War in 
1953, China began to restrict people’s coming from Hong Kong to China for fear 
that spies might penetrate China from Hong Kong, where capitalist ideology 
was considered as crime. If the Hong Kong people wanted to go back to China, 
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 they needed to carry a single entry recommendation form issued by the 
Chinese government; and the form would be taken back by the Chinese 
government after they returned back to Hong Kong.16 In other words, Hong 
Kong people’s identity was re-constructed as “outsider” which further 
accelerated their alienation from the Mainland China. The hostility relaxed after 
the Open Door policy in 1978, the recommendation form was replaced by a 
multiple entry document, which could be used for ten years. Later, the 
document was replaced by an entry card which also simplified the procedure of 
entry. After the smart ID card issued in 2003, eventually, Hong Kong people 
could be able to enter China without any document. Through ID card and travel 
document, Hong Kong people’s identity has been constructed and re-
constructed when integration with China becomes more intense.  
 
The historical development in 1997 officially brought Hong Kong and 
China together. The threshold of the liminal status however needs time to 
reduce. In fact, after eight years of Tung’s administration, people in Hong Kong 
began to realize that there was price to pay through the process of identification 
reconstruction. To move too close to China (hyper-assimilation) will result in 
losing Hong Kong’s identity. In terms of economic development, some criticisms 
question the status of Hong Kong as a financial center within China’s influence. 
They question not the direct control from China, but the self regulation and 
relaxation of rules and financial policies of Hong Kong when more and more 
financial and economic clout have been controlled by the Chinese capital.17
 
In terms of social and cultural idenitity, Hong Kong people speak 
Cantonese rather than Mandarin. Hong Kong uses complicated Chinese 
characters rather than simplified characters. Such cultural identities however 
have been considered as not progressive enough to catch up with the 
unification with China because Mandarin is the official language.  Hong Kong 
people need to communicate with the Mainland Chinese in Mandarin. However, 
many Hong Kong people may ask, even they can communicate in Mandarin, 
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 will they be considered as Mainlanders? When they fully adapt to use Mandarin, 
will they not be required to perform more functions which considered as more 
congruent to be Chinese? Certainly, the identity gap between Hong Kong and 
China is not as wide as what Rudyard Kipling once mentioned East is East, 
West is West. Nevertheless, the liminal citizenship has to be reconciled through 
ways in which adaptability can be facilitated beneficially to both sides. 
Otherwise, Hong Kong people will loose their own identity, and perhaps their 
own advantages. 
 
Evolution and Development of Taiwan’s Identity 
The Clear and Presence Influence of China  
 
Identity searching in Taiwan has become more important today than that in 
the past because the political parties have been trying to make use of 
Taiwanese identities to reconstruct the political loyalty of the Taiwan people. 
Democratization in Taiwan also arouses national identity of the people by using 
ethnicity as well as language to reconstruct new political culture which affects 
the political climate in Taiwan. Taiwan’s economic development in the 1970s 
and 1980s contrasted with the economic backwardness in China that further 
distanced them apart. After the open door policy in 1978 and the continuation of 
economic growth, the economic gap between China and Taiwan becomes 
narrow.  
 
Yet, in terms of Cross Strait relations, the change of political culture cum 
democratization will affect the political inclination between independence and 
unification. The pressing need for locating Taiwan’s identity accelerated after 
the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. In his study Ethnic Identity and Nationalism 
in Taiwan, John Sheng Chu echoed that “On July 1, 1997, when Hong Kong 
was returned to China after years of prosperity under British colonization, 
Taiwan’s unclear political status and future relationship with Mainland China 
once again caused major tensions in the minds of Taiwanese and Chinese.”18 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 10                                                          
 
10
 However, the very core relation between Taiwan and China is still the meaning 
of being Chinese. As what Gary Klintworth had pointed out that  
 
“In one way or another, it was China that provided the basic ingredients for 
Taiwan’s rise to fame and fortune. Japan built the economic foundations of 
modern Taiwan and the United States supplied critical financial aid and military 
protection to speed it on its way. But it was from China that the Chinese people 
migrated and derived their Chineseness.”19
 
On another issue, the searching for identity in Taiwan has also been 
dramatized by the political economy of the foreign direct investment to China. 
The economy of Taiwan is split between two groups: the haves and have-nots. 
The haves are those people who have been investing heavily in China in 
economic as well as political capital. They tend to be more positive toward the 
economic relations between China and Taiwan. In July 2005, the 
CommonWealth magazine in Taiwan questioned whether Taishang (Taiwanese 
businessmen) were still based on Taiwan.20  Six out of ten biggest foreign 
investors were from Taiwan. The fact is that, they warn, the very latest 
development of Taishang begin to employ more Chinese bureaucrats. They 
even do not rely on capital from Taiwan.21  The have-nots are those people who 
do not or could not invest in China, resulting in placing all their political stakes in 
Taiwan. They feel that their economic opportunity and international space have 
been restrained.22 Such dichotomy of the economic capital will certainly affect 
the political inclination of the Taiwanese, making the use of identity to 
reformulate their political, cultural, economic and social bondage in Taiwan. In 
other words, the more the economic interaction with the PRC, the more 
necessary to establish one’s identity.     
 
Construction of Taiwanese Identity through Mass Media  
 
The identity of Taiwanese is a very complicated issue. Its very notion of 
the meaning of identity embedded in its history, colonization development, 
ethnic composition, Cross Strait relations, political development, 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 10                                                          
 
11
 democratization and nationalism. Historically speaking, Taiwan has been 
described as an “immigrant society” which effectively consolidates Taiwanese 
social solidarity through history. Nevertheless, due to her unique development, 
the searching for Taiwanese identity should also be studied along the history, 
economic development and democratization. 
 
Chen Dung-Sheng summarized that: 
“Historically, Taiwan was an immigrant society, but most of its early 
immigrants were males. Therefore, social organizations based on blood 
relationships did not become dominant at the beginning of Han society. Instead 
shared ethnicity (co-origin) or co-dialect of immigrants from the mainland 
performed an important role in connecting individuals. … The characteristics of 
the immigrant society have made Taiwan experience a different pattern of 
transformation of social solidarity principles.”23
 
In terms of ethnicity, there are inter differences between Taiwanese and 
mainlander. One of the most famous historical incidents was 2-28 incident in 
1947 when many Taiwanese were killed by the ruling KMT government.24 For 
ethnic issues, there are intra ethnic differences among Hakka, Minnan and 
Aborigine within the Taiwanese. According to Chen Pin-Hao, ethnicity is very 
important in understanding the formation of Taiwanese identity because it helps 
to locate the power relations and the understanding the political changes in 
Taiwan. 
 
“Theoretically, ethnic identity is not only useful in assessing some issues 
such as party support or policy preference. It also enhances our understanding 
of how ethnicity becomes a force in mobilizing political participation. It is with 
the presence of ethnic identity that ethnic origin then becomes a meaningful 
factor in explaining political behaviours among the Taiwanese people.”25
 
In the data analysis of the 1995 Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted 
by the Academia Sinica of Taiwan, Chen assessed the degree of influence of 
different mass media channels, for example TV news, radio, printed media, in 
the construction of the national identity of four groups of people in Taiwan: 
Taiwanese nationalist (pro independence), Chinese nationalist (pro unification), 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 10                                                          
 
12
 pragmatist (yes to both) and conservatives (no opinion).26 The finding was that 
“The present study showed that media use made only a moderate impact 
among the Taiwanese people regarding the issue of national identity.”27    
 
Certainly, even within Taiwan, the interpretation of ethnicity is considered 
to be very alarming. One has to deal with the issue very carefully otherwise it 
will become the bone of contentions between political parties which want to 
occupy the sphere of political influence through the manipulation of ethnic 
differences.28 In practice, however, we have seen the rise of ethnic influence in 
Taiwan’s politics ever since Chen Shui-bian has become the president. For 
instance, the aboriginal ethic group “Tailu”, which was officially recognized as 
the 12th indigenous group in 2004, began to launch the self-administration 
movement.29     
 
If ethnicity establishes the very foundation of identity development in 
Taiwan, mass media has become more active to popularize their expression of 
identity. After the lifting of the martial law in 1987, Taiwan’s media has been 
relaxed. The liberalization and “democratization” of mass media in Taiwan gave 
rise to the blossoming of the media industry. According to Gary Rawnsley and 
Minh-Yeh Rawnsley’s study on Taiwan’s media reform, up to the mid of 2003, 
Taiwan has 602 newspapers, 174 radio stations, four national television stations 
and hundreds of cable channels.30 However, they also warned that quantity did 
not equal to quality. The emancipation of mass media symbolizes political 
freedom. Therefore any reform or criticism from the government or the authority 
will be regarded as abridging the freedom of speech, making the vicious circle 
of the production of some low quality, indecent and simply poor programmes. 
They especially criticize the TV media.  
 
“However, the market does not guarantee quality. As competition 
intensifies, the media are less willing to invest in innovative programming and 
instead battle to capture the same middle-ground audiences with the same 
formats. This is particularly serious in television, where the national stations 
now compete with the cable channels that are gaining popularity.”31
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 10                                                          
 
13
 To name but a few interesting phenomenon, on the TV screen of news 
report, there is an anchor presenting with subtitles running at the bottoms, on 
the top and sometimes on the right telling the audiences other pieces of news 
happening elsewhere. If this is not information explosion, this kind of multi-
dimensional news encroachment will certainly paralyse your sense, if not your 
mind. In addition, among the hundred strong television channels in Taiwan, the 
coverage and the degree of diversification are literally to instigate people from 
listening to or understanding of local social, economic and political relations and 
across the strait. Some cluster of channels cover stock market predictions by 
some financial experts and some other cluster of channels covering Buddhism 
preaching, amongst many other news channels, etc.  
 
If those channels reflect some of the preferences of the audiences, one 
possible explanation would be that there are many audiences who want to 
search for alternatives. Buddhism, for instance, is an alternative for those who 
want to disassociate from the capitalist creed or market modernity, which is 
supposed to be flooded with sins and different kinds of wrongdoings. By 
listening to the Buddhism preaching, one’s mind and soul can be relieved, 
sometimes redeemed if following closely those preaching. The belief in 
redemption and the Buddhism spirit, perhaps other Chinese religions as well, 
may also help explain the reason why the institutionalization of democracy is 
less consolidated in Taiwan than that in other Western societies, making 
corruption, scandals and administrative ineptness mingling easily with the 
political system. Although some channels seem to be tacky and even indecent, 
the government has no alternative but just to put up with this kind of media with 
an ostrich policy. Of course, from the TV station’s points of view, the production 
of such programmes may probably be the only source of income because there 
are viewers; and therefore there are advertisements. 32  Yet, it also can be 
interpreted as a way in which neither does the government want to offend the 
people (the voters) nor does it want to offend the media (the umpire). 33  
Nevertheless, it appeared that Taiwanese government began to stiffen the TV 
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 and media by cancelling licences of channels covering sexual and tacky 
nature.34
 
The New Taiwanese: Ma Ying-jeou 
 
In his book The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity, Lee 
Teng-hui recalled a scenario which happened during the political campaign in 
the late 1990s when both Ma Ying-jeou (the newly elected KMT Chairman in 
2005) and Lee were on the stage. Lee confronted Ma and said to him that 
“Listen, my friend Ma, where are you from? What are you [italic in original]?” Ma, 
according to Lee, responded with great dignity that “I was brought up in Taiwan 
and raised on the nourishing food of Taiwan. I love Taiwan. I am a new 
Taiwanese.”35 Lee further elaborated the meaning of New Taiwanese as: 
 
“The effect of ‘new Taiwanese’ is to confirm Taiwan’s identity; the term 
sums up the achievement of the Taiwanese people in having created their own 
government and having established a political system that works for them. It 
reminds us all that the people of Taiwan are committed to building a flourishing 
and unbiased society.”36
  
Thereafter, the term New Taiwanese became a concept which derived 
many debates on the notion of the meaning of being a Taiwanese and the 
searching for identity.37 Peter Yu, a professor from Ming Chuan University in 
Taiwan, argued that if there is New Taiwanese, there must be “Old Taiwanese.” 
It is also important, according to him, to look at the transformation and the 
dialectical development of the term New Taiwanese.38 Yet, what does it mean 
by “New Taiwanese”? Obviously, it seems that it is very hard to generalise the 
concept because it was derived from a politician in a unique circumstance 
referring to a unique candidate. It is very hard to know exactly the meaning 
behind this concept.  
 
However, if this term refers to Ma Ying-jeou in particular, we may be able 
to search some elements from Ma to nourish the term. Ma Ying-jeou was born 
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 in Hong Kong on July 13, 1950 in Kwong Wah hospital, which is not a private 
but public hospital serving general public and ordinary people. I was told by his 
father, the late Mr Ma Ho-ling, who was the political advisor, speech writer and 
basically think tank of Chiang Kai-shek that at some point during the fall of the 
KMT, he raised his family (including Ma Ying-jeou) by opening a small café in 
the late 1940s and the early 1950s in Kai Tak amusement park (demolished 
already) in Kowloon providing snack as well as having some singers performing 
occasionally for a short period of time in the café before he moved to Taiwan 
later. Ma Ying-jeou was later graduated from the National Taiwan University 
and also obtained a law degree from Harvard University. 39  Thereafter, he 
served the government in different positions. Finally, he became the Mayor of 
Taipei before becoming the Chairman of the KMT in the first direct election for 
Chairmanship of the KMT in 2005. For personal characteristics, he also 
considered to be a new force to reform the KMT, especially on the corruption 
issues. In the KMT Chairman election on July 16, 2005, he took 75 percent 
more votes than his counterpart, Wang Jin-ping.40
 
These qualities and personal history demonstrate some of the uniqueness 
of Ma himself. It seems that institutionalized curriculum vitae is what he has 
developed along his previous working experience and educational background. 
Such CV also provides a very convincing score result, which signposts one 
good remark to add onto the voting during the election. In addition, among the 
Taiwanese, his background also gives rise to some good image for the 
Taiwanese to project, if not assimilate with Ma because of his achievement, his 
educational background and after all the meritocracy behind him.41 It is not sure 
whether this image can be translated into his political capital. Nevertheless, to 
look back, his vision on Cross Strait relations has always been very clear. When 
he was the spokesman and Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in 
Taiwan between 1991-1993, he painted the picture of Cross Strait relations:  
 
“People in the ROC on Taiwan would like to see peaceful and democratic 
changes, not revolutionary chaos, on the Chinese mainland… the ROC 
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 government should (1) stick firmly to the final goal of national unification while 
pursuing neither immediate unification with nor permanent separation from the 
mainland; (2) establish order in cross-Straits interchange and prudently manage 
its pace on the basis of the Guidelines for National Unification; and (3) maintain 
sufficient defence capability and continue its current “pragmatic diplomacy’ to 
broaden its international relations…Communist Chinese leaders love to boast 
that what they practise on the mainland is ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’. People in the ROC in Taiwan sincerely hope, on the contrary, 
that there will be more and more Chinese characteristics, and less and less 
socialism on the Chinese mainland.”42
 
He subscribed to unification and Chineseness along his vision on Cross 
Strait relations. He also mentioned order behind the relations. If these represent 
his political ideology on Cross Strait relations, these elements may also be 
characterized the so-called New Taiwanese. In a recent discussion during 
Chinese New Year in February 2006, Ma further encouraged the mainland 
Chinese to join KMT. In terms of cross strait relations, he mentioned that 
unification is possible when the economic, political and social differences 
between China and Taiwan become narrowed. 43  When asked by Stephen 
Sackur, the host of HARDtalk (one of the BBC TV programmes) on 21 February 
2006, Ma regarded the trip of Lian Chan was to resume the dialogue between 
Taiwan and Beijing in a way to bring peace and stability to Taiwan people. He 
mentioned that after Lian’s speech at Beijing University there was already a 
relaxation of the hostility in China toward Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan 
government should keep negotiating with Chinese government, and this is the 
only way.44
 
Language and Taiwanese Identity 
 
Language is important in defining one’s identity. Mandarin has been use in 
Mainland China as the formal language. Yet, there are many dialects being 
spoken by many people in China. For example, Cantonese, the second most 
important dialect, has been used by many Chinese within as well as outside 
China. I still remember that when I paid visit to my grandfather’s village in 
Guangdong, where people mainly speaking in Cantonese, in the early 1980s, 
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 there were labels saying Tongzhimen qingjiangputonghua (Comrades please 
speak in Putonghua [Mandarin]) inside those stores. In other words, although 
formal language has been adopted by the PRC, in practise, people do speak 
their own dialects to an extent that the government has to encourage people to 
speak the formal language. Apart from Chinese societies, Chinese diaspora in 
Southeast Asia also speak different dialects. Basically, ‘The diversity and 
heterogeneity of the use of Chinese dialects for communication varies 
according to country of residence, generational differences and social and 
economic background.’45  
 
In Taiwan, language has always become the bone of contention by the 
government to justify its authority and legitimacy. According to Wachman, the 
arrival of the KMT in Taiwan after the defeat by the CCP in 1949 also brought 
the movement of purification of language, which meant Mandarin should be 
used as a formal language. He described 
 
“In the very earliest years after the KMT arrived, teachers still used both 
Mandarin and Taiwanese to explain material in class. In 1953, the government 
mandated that neither Taiwanese nor Japanese be used as a language of 
instruction, and in 1964 a law was passed forbidding the use of Taiwanese in 
schools or official settings. This was accompanied by a campaign that 
emphasized the grace of Mandarin and the comparative vulgarity of 
Taiwanese.”46
 
Therefore, the status of Taiyu (Taiwanese language) was officially 
suppressed under KMT’s language policy. According to Henning Klöter, the 
KMT also set up jiuchadui (patrols) to enable the using of the official language 
in school as formal language.47  In 1976, The Broadcast and Television Law 
began to limit the use languages other than Mandarin on television and on 
radio.48 However, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Taiwan began to move 
toward the liberalization and democratization process. Partly, it was because of 
the relaxation of government policy due to liberalization. Partly, it was due to the 
economic development of Taiwan in the 1970s and the 1980s, which conjured 
up the nationalistic ideas on the importance of Taiwan. Coupled with the 
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 democratization process later, local language became more and more 
politicized.  
 
Language policy on the restriction of using Taiyu and other local dialects 
became relaxed in the late 1980s. In 1987, three of the state television stations 
began to use Taiyu to broadcast news.49 Elective Taiyu language courses were 
introduced in 1990 in Yilan County among the elementary and junior high 
schools; The Interior Minister officially admitted that the repressive language 
policy was wrong; and the Minister of Education also included “local culture 
education” to the curriculum of the elementary and junior high schools.50 After 
the victory of DPP in 2000, language policy (this time in a revered manner) 
resurfaced as the major policy to re-create Taiwanese nationalism under Chen 
Shui-bian’s government. In Klöter’s own assessment, “The inclusion of 
Taiwanese and other local languages into the school curriculum marks a crucial 
turning point in Taiwanese language policies.”51
 
From the PRC’s points of view, the indigenization of Taiyu and other local 
dialects in Taiwan was used by the DPP government to facilitate de facto 
independence of Taiwan. The objective is mainly to enhance Taiwanese identity 
and to alienate if not disassociate China from Taiwan.52 Through five steps of 
empowering language policies, Zhao regarded the Taiwanese government as 
trying to construct a social and cultural environment to further implement 
independence. The five steps are: 
 
1. abandoning existing language to raise the status of the local dialects; 
2. creating written language for Taiyu in order to institutionalize, standardize 
and modernize the language; 
3. creating different phonetic for Taiyu, Hakka and other Austronesian 
languages;  
4. decreasing the number of teaching hours on classic Chinese and 
increasing the number of teaching hours on local culture; 
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 5. establishing new departments in high schools and creating new web sites 
on studying and researching Taiyu.53        
  
The movement toward the indigenization of Taiyu was both government 
induced as well as democratization driven. As we have mentioned before, the 
victory of the DPP deliberately reinforced the status of Taiyu. Yet, under the 
democratic election, every Taiwanese politician has to be able to use Taiyu to 
communicate, if not please the voters. Taiyu becomes the medium between 
voters and candidates. Not to mention speaking, one still needed to be asked 
(sometimes by their political enemies, sometimes by their voters) their levels of 
Taiwanese ingredients (how many generations of living in Taiwan). Languages, 
nationalism and democratization in Taiwan are reinforcing one another. Ju 
Haitao, an editor of a Chinese magazine in China, contended that “political 
democratization in Taiwan and liberalization empower Taiwanese nationalism 
as well as their individual thinking by increasing their political freedom. … Yet, 
when more interaction begins to develop across the Strait, people will start to 
realize the real nature of Chinese identity is not the narrow one that created by 
the Taiwanese government.”54
 
How successful does language policy re-create Taiwanese identity, 
especially the youngsters? According to Yang, the so-called de-sinitization, 
either through language or cultural, is not successful. On the contrary, there are 
more new graduates who want to work in China, more post-graduate students 
who want to study in China, more new Chinese book stores selling simplified 
version Chinese books in Taiwan and more youngsters who want to travel in 
China.55 This is a very important issue, further by Yang, because if the Chinese 
government truly appreciates this newly development in Taiwan, they can make 
use of the trend to create an environment to cultivate genuine relations and re-
capture the heart of these people in order to open more space for unification.56 
Referring to my argument before, the formal language also signifies a token to 
unification between China and Taiwan among the haves who invest in China, 
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 empowering both the formal languages as well as the capital. The socially 
constructed language environment in Taiwan is very intriguing. When 
knowledge is power, language is power too. This is a challenge to both 
governments. 
 
Democratization and Identity Construction 
 
For the Taiwanese, democracy is considered to be one of the most 
important political achievements in Taiwan because it was the first time in 
Chinese history that democracy was ever practised on Chinese soil.57 Yet, from 
the political development of Taiwan’s points of view, according to T. Y. Wang, 
the rapid democratization in Taiwan also allowed the Taiwanese identity to be 
created through the institutional changes in the political and party 
development.58 In looking at the political and economic changes in Taiwan, the 
democratization process enables some cultural factors: languages, ethnicity, etc 
to be re-aggregated and re-articulated through the party formation as well as 
through the systematic election.  As John Fuh-sheng Hsieh argued, “But, as 
Taiwan moved from authoritarianism to democracy, ethnicity lost some of its 
salience in politics, and in its stead, national identity became a much more 
important factor in dividing people into different political camp.”59 In other words, 
democratization in Taiwan gives rise to the nation building, from which national 
identity will be very different from those mainland Chinese who never 
experienced the fruit of democracy. 
 
When the martial law was lifted on July 15, 1987, Taiwan began to move 
toward political openness and liberalization. According to Christopher R. 
Hughes, the democratization process of Taiwan was heavily instigated by the 
overseas Taiwaness influence. He contended, “By 1986, this overseas 
opposition had become impatient with its counterpart in Taiwan. Some 
successes had been achieved in the United States through agitating Senators 
to Taiwan in August 1986, and the passing of a resolution on 1 August by the 
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 House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee, urging the KMT to lift 
its ban on new political parties.”60 Eventually the opposition party DPP was 
established on September 28, 1986. Since democratization is a process, the 
political openness and the development of opposition party helped lay the 
ground work of institutional democracy in Taiwan. “Depending on one’s 
definition”, maintained by Alan Wachman, “one might even say that with the 
elections of the Legislative Yuan in December 1992, Taiwan has become 
democratic.”61       
 
If anything can really constitute one’s national identity, the first direct 
election in 1996 of Lee Teng-hui and the peaceful transferring of power from 
KMT to DPP in the 2000 election were two major developments of Taiwanese 
national identity. On the Taiwan side, throughout these political developments, 
the social and political identity of the general public in Taiwan were fertilized by 
their experiences of the fruit of democracy and political freedom. According to a 
study of the political development of the four generations of Taiwanese by Andy 
Chang and T. Y. Wang, there was a significant change of the national identity of 
the Taiwanese, especially the young generation. They concluded, “… the 
identity of Taiwanese citizens has experienced significant changes during the 
eight-year period between 1994 and 2002. Many of them, especially the 
younger generations, have increasingly moved away from a Chinese identity 
and have adopted a dual identity, considering themselves as both Chinese and 
Taiwanese.”62’ 
 
Whilst Taiwanese were developing their dual identity during this period, 
Chinese government was very much fear of the flirting with this political 
development by the Taiwanese political leaders and the declining of the 
Chinese identity among the new generation.63 On the China’s side, it seemed 
fair to say that China was quite ill-prepared for such political development in 
Taiwan to be nurtured to such extent during this period. The climax of anxiety 
culminated in the 2004 presidential election when Chen was re-elected by a 
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 hairpin margin. China’s Taiwan policy began to allow both “carrot and stick” to 
work together. The Taiwan Write Paper and the Anti-Secession Law were two 
major ground works to set the agenda of unification. On the flip side, carrots 
included direct flight in the early 2005, meeting Taiwanese political leaders, 
relaxation of agriculture import from Taiwan and other cultural exchanges. 
However, it seems fair to say that democratization has gone very fast in Taiwan, 
allowing some autonomy and determination to be decided by the society and 
the civic culture. From Cross Strait political development, this may be the only 
absolute advantage that Taiwan is having an upper hand over re-unification with 
China. In addition, this may be the only way that can fundamentally change the 
political rhetoric on Cross Strait relations, if not the political reform in mainland 
China.    
  
Conclusion 
 
I have mentioned the experience that developed along the identity building 
of Hong Kong people after the changeover in 1997. One of the major influences 
is that economic adaptability pushes those Hong Kong people to their very limit 
to piece with the rise of China. Some of them who are weak in adaptation and 
adjustment, resulting in resorting to the social welfare from the government, if 
not committing suicide. Although we cannot be able to re-interview those people 
who died in Cheung Chau whether they were died out of the pressure of the 
economic down turn, psychological problem or un-adaptability of the 
changeover, we certainly realize that the raise with the fastest economic engine 
of the world is not an easy game. Deng Xiaoping once said that Hong Kong 
would remain un-change for 50 years. Yet, in referring to their social, political 
and economic identity, things have been changing in tandem. Their liminal 
citizenship, through the study of the transformation of the ID card and the 
creation of the Huixiangzheng, demonstrates their re-construction of identity 
along the integration with the Mainland China. This is an on-going process. This 
is a unique story for the Hong Kong people.           
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 To understand, many people in Taiwan become disinterested in either the 
jumping onto the bandwagon of the rise of China or to stick with the idea of 
independence. They are being indifferent of the political and social situation. 
The mass media in Taiwan provides some “neurotherapy” to the public with 
“dancing dopamine” (tacky TV shows), if not “information Prozac” (news) to cure 
the general public’s depressive feeling towards the economy or the politics. 
National identity, the political rhetoric of the New Taiwanese, language policy 
and the democratization process are constructing a very unique Taiwan which 
is very different from China in many aspects. As Khan Farooq argued “The 
subject of identity is the central question for every human being and nation 
because it not only defines who we are but also how we should live.”64 Among 
the people in Greater China, perhaps, there is not much disagreement on 
whether they are Chinese or not. However, the ways in which how they should 
live are definitely very different. In the international environment, the rise of 
China gives rise to many talking points for people in general and some 
speculations and analysis among policy makers and academic workers.65 Yet, 
among those Chinese (Hong Kong and Taiwan) who experience and live with 
the date-to-date rapprochement of the “clear and present influence” of the PRC, 
there comes those middle-ground ways for them to choose away from the 
political and economic extremes. Yet, this categorisation may not be exclusive 
in trying to capture the whole development of the general public towards public 
affairs. They point to some illustrations which may be useful in trying to examine 
the social response in Taiwan toward the rise of China. 
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